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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This Staff Working Document (SWD) provides the Social Investment Package's underpinning 
evidence on the long-term trends and short-term social challenges that Europe is facing.  
The document demonstrates that large differences exist between Member States, but that they 
face similar long-term challenges. Demographic changes, an ageing population and decreased 
fertility are leading to a smaller working-age population and increasing dependency ratios. 
This threatens the solidity of financing for social protection budgets, which are generally 
financed through labour taxation. At the same time, the economic, social and financial crisis 
has aggravated this situation. Further, it has increased (long-term) unemployment, social 
exclusion and poverty across Europe. 
This SWD highlights the three functions of social policy expenditure — social investment, 
social protection and economic stabilisation — and shows how they complement and 
reinforce each other. It analyses the size and structure of these budgets, their efficiency and 
their adequacy. In doing so, it makes the case that the size, structure and design of social 
policies all matter for the performance of welfare systems. Expenditure on social policies that 
focus on social investment is shown to be linked with greater returns to employment. To help 
illustrate this point, the paper also provides detailed analysis of social policy budgets and their 
financing before and after the crisis.  
The SWD focuses further on the risks people face at different stages of their life courses, and 
points out that a difficulty experienced at one stage of a person's life can often interact with 
other difficulties later, and may exacerbate them. Successful policy interventions mitigate 
disadvantage and prevent it from becoming compounded. Often it is more efficient and 
effective to prevent than to cure, better to anticipate and prepare, than it is to repair. Evidence 
in this document shows that certain policies with a focus on prevention and on developing 
human capital can result in considerable savings later on. This knowledge specifically builds a 
case for early child education and care (ECEC) and active inclusion measures.  
Lastly, the paper notes the main obstacles to obtaining timely and comprehensive social 
statistics. These jeopardise the way Member States can design their policy interventions, how 
those efforts are monitored in the European Semester and how EU funding is directed. In 
response to the issue, it sets out the way forward to improve the availability and timeliness of 
good social data.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
European societies have been changing and will continue to change profoundly and 
rapidly in a number of interlinked areas with major implications for social outcomes and 
thus for social policy. These areas include demography, family structure, employment, 
poverty and social inclusion. At the same time the social policy responses and 
programmes have themselves been undergoing reform in response to economic and 
social change. The interaction of all of these defines the context for future social policy-
making. Social developments in the European Union are also increasingly influenced by 
the global economy. Many countries outside the EU are experiencing similar challenges, 
and are engaging in efforts to extend social protection, particularly in emerging 
economies. 
Demographic changes, an ageing population and decreased fertility mean fewer people of 
working age and increasing dependency ratios. Though a longer life and better health are 
of course intrinsically desirable, a smaller population of working age relative to the 
elderly will not only impact the design of Member States' health systems, but will also 
threaten the solidity of financing for social protection budgets, which are generally 
financed through labour taxation. Meanwhile, changes in family sizes and structures have 
led to weaker support systems, as social protection models have failed to adapt. The 
workforce will become increasingly diverse as the population of working age 
shrinks. Member States are introducing measures to enable more women, older people 
and non-EU nationals to join the labour market. In a very positive development, workers 
are increasingly mobile, but this sometimes creates problems as children and older people 
are left without family support.   
In the decade before the crisis, economic and employment growth in general improved 
overall living standards. Many governments were able to devote more resources to social 
policy intervention. However inequalities often grew, so poverty and social exclusion 
remained a major issue in most EU countries. This included people in employment, 
though the pattern was very uneven across Europe. The economic crisis has 
exacerbated economic and social pressures. Recent data
1 point to higher levels and 
deeper forms of poverty and social exclusion. The proportion of people at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion has risen in a number of Member States since 2008. 
The crisis has also brought about increasing divergence between Member States and 
between regions of the EU. Unemployment and poverty are major issues in most EU 
countries, but there are substantial differences among them. The risks of falling into and 
the chances of getting out of poverty also vary across Member States, and significant 
differences can also be observed in terms of efficiency of spending when it comes to 
poverty reduction.
2 The structure of employment across the EU also continues to become 
more polarised between high-income and low-income jobs, resulting in increases in 
inequality and thus in relative poverty. Not only do these trends run counter to European 
values of fairness and dignity for all, they also pose a threat to our economy, as poverty 
and social exclusion bring with them significant social and economic costs. 
                                                 
1   European Commission (2012) Draft joint employment report,. 
2   European Commission (2012) Employment and social developments in Europe 2012.  
3 
Some Member States have sought to confront the long- and short-term challenges with 
reforms to their social models, changing both the sizes and the structures of their social 
protection systems. Those that have been most successful in meeting these challenges are 
those that have maintained adequate social protection systems, reformed their labour 
markets and adopted policies strongly emphasising social investment, which seeks to 
empower individuals by facilitating the development of their human capital. These social 
investment policies reinforce social policies that protect and stabilise by addressing 
some of the causes of disadvantage and giving people tools with which to improve their 
social situations. Education and training in particular play a key role in breaking the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty and improving people's outcomes.
3 Measures to 
reform labour markets to make them more inclusive can also improve individuals' 
opportunities to make best use of their skills. 
This paper looks at current social trends and challenges that the EU is facing in greater 
detail, and outlines how these have affected poverty and social exclusion. It puts a strong 
focus on the specific risks people experience at different stages of their life courses, and 
shows that a difficulty experienced at one stage of a person's life can often interact with 
other difficulties later, and may exacerbate them. Social policy interventions, especially 
those with a social investment focus, may help to mitigate disadvantage and prevent 
it from becoming compounded. Such interventions take various forms, such as early 
child education and care (ECEC), up-skilling opportunities, and inclusive labour market 
measures. 
To help illustrate this point, the paper also provides detailed analysis of social policy 
budgets and their financing before and after the crisis. It discusses the three functions of 
social policy expenditure — social investment, social protection and economic 
stabilisation. It shows how these functions complement and reinforce each other. It then 
analyses the size and structure of these budgets, their efficiency and their adequacy. In 
doing so, it highlights that it is not only different levels of social policy expenditure, 
but also different types of expenditure, that affect social outcomes — among other 
factors. Expenditure on social policies that focus on social investment is shown to be 
linked with greater returns to employment. It is also shown that social policy 
interventions to tackle disadvantage throughout the course of life appear to yield the 
highest returns if started as early in life as possible. 
Finally, the paper notes the main obstacles to obtaining timely and comprehensive social 
statistics, which may impede the ability to take stock of and compare the living 
conditions of people across the EU, identifying those most excluded from society and 
monitoring the full impact of social policies. Improved monitoring will help Member 
States better target their policy interventions, which will help them improve 
delivery on the Europe 2020 employment, education and poverty targets. It will also 
better orient the direction of EU funding. 
2.  THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL PROTECTION BUDGETS 
Following Musgrave's classical framework,
4 which defines the three main functions of 
public intervention in the economy as stabilisation (aimed at securing economic 
stabilisation, in particular of GDP but also of employment and price levels), distribution 
                                                 
3    European Commission Communication - Rethinking Education: Investing in skills for better socio-economic outcomes. 
COM(2012) 669 final 
4   Musgrave, R. A. (1959) The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy.  
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(aimed at securing adjustments in the distribution of income and wealth, not least an 
equitable distribution of incomes) and resource allocation (aimed at securing adjustments 
in the allocation of resources and in particular the efficient use of resources), social 
policies can be considered according to the three functions of social investment 
(primarily linked to the allocation function), social protection (primarily linked to the 
distribution function, considered in a very broad approach covering in particular 
distribution of incomes over the life course) and stabilisation of the economy. 
Investment function. A key function of social budgets is to strengthen people’s skills 
and capacities, in order to prepare them for confronting or preventing risks over the life 
course and improving their future prospects. In other words, social policies show their 
effects not only immediately at the time they are implemented, but also have lasting 
impacts: with the characteristics of an investment by offering some returns over time, for 
instance in terms of increased employment or labour incomes, thus enhancing growth. In 
particular, social policies ‘prepare’ individuals, families and societies to adapt to various 
risks and transformations (such as changing career patterns, new working conditions or 
an ageing population, cf. Vandenbroucke et al., 2011)
5 and can thus reduce the need for 
responses intended to ‘repair’ adverse situations. 
For example, good quality childcare and early childhood education have been proven to 
have a strong impact on improving children’s chances of finishing their studies and 
finding employment, or of avoiding extreme risks such as delinquency and drug abuse. 
Preventive health care and health and safety at work help people to avoid sickness and 
maintain their productivity. Retraining and lifelong education help people to maintain 
employability and to obtain better jobs over their working careers. Promoting a healthy 
lifestyle, rehabilitation and improving access to assistive devices enable older people to 
lead independent lives as they become frail and develop functional limitations. 
Box — A growing focus on a social investment approach 
The social investment approach stresses the case for considering certain parts of employment and 
social policies — and possibly other policy areas, such as education — as entailing investments 
improving prospects for future employment and social participation, together with more social 
cohesion and stability (Van Kersbergen and Hemerijck, 2012), thus stressing the life course 
dimension of social policies and their long-term benefits for society. 
The focus on social policies as an investment in developing human capital has been gaining 
ground in Europe since the early 1990s, in particular with the work of Esping Andersen (1992).
6 
The last two decades have recently been analysed as a period of emergence of a ‘Social 
Investment State’ in Europe (Van Kersbergen and Hemerijck 2012),
7 while the roots of the social 
investment approach have been located in work on social protection as a productive factor 
developed in Sweden by Alva and Gunnar Myrdal in the 1930s (Morel, Palier and Palme 2012).
8 
It has recently been argued that deficits in social investment in some Member States can 
contribute to explaining the current disequilibria observed in EMU (Hemerijck and 
Vandenbroucke, 2012). 
                                                 
5   Vandenbroucke, F. and Vleminckx, K. (2011) ‘Disappointing poverty trends: is the social investment state to blame? An 
exercise in soul searching for policy makers’, CSB Working paper, No 11/01. 
6
   Esping Andersen, G. (1992) ‘The making of a social democratic welfare state’, in M. Misgeld and L. Amark (eds), Creating 
social democracy, a century of the Social Democratic Labor Party in Sweden, The Pennsylvania State University Press. 
7   Van Kersbergen, K. and Hemerijck, A. (2012) ‘Two decades of change in Europe: the emergence of the social investment state’, 
Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 41, Issue 03.  See also Hemerijck (2012). Changing welfare states, Oxford. 
8   Morel, N., Palier, B. and Palme, J. (2012) 'Towards a social investment welfare State? Ideas, policies and challenges' The Policy 
Press, University of Bristol.  
5 
Protection function. Social budgets also have the function of supporting and protecting 
people when they have to deal with the reality of some social risk. For instance, social 
insurance pools risks and redistributes contribution revenues in benefits to those affected 
by those risks. 
Typically, unemployment benefits provide people with an income as they look for jobs, 
and social assistance does the same if they are unemployed for a prolonged period, while 
it also supports those who for one reason or another cannot go out to work. Social 
protection provides insurance against social risks over the course of life (e.g. health and 
long-term care, sickness benefits, disability and survivors' pensions) and also 
redistributes income from those actively in work to those who have retired (e.g., through 
pensions). 
Stabilisation function. In periods of economic downturn, the need for social 
intervention rises rapidly, while receipts also automatically decline, which has a 
substantial countercyclical macro-economic effect, dampening fluctuations in GDP and 
in household incomes. 
Typically, unemployment benefits (and to a lesser extent other benefits such as social 
assistance) automatically rise in scale in response to a downturn, while retraining 
schemes, which are part of active labour market policies, also increase in volume. This 
cushions the impact of an economic downturn or crisis on those directly affected (e.g., by 
losing their jobs or working fewer hours). Pensions also stabilise incomes towards the 
end of life and offer a second line of automatic stabilisers, as they remain stable while 
active incomes decline. 
In the current economic context, public budgets are under pressure due to fiscal 
consolidation concerns. While some Member States have more fiscal space, most 
Member States have little room to spend more on social protection.  It is therefore 
essential to ensure the best use of existing resources and to avoid potential lasting 
adverse effects of solely savings driven adjustments on the short term and longer term 
employment and growth prospects. In this respect, well designed social systems 
combining the social investment dimension with the other two functions of 
protection and stabilisation, can contribute to increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency of social policies. 
In practice, social policies actually very often support two or all three of these 
functions, which are mutually reinforcing. It would thus be misleading to allocate 
individual items of expenditure to a specific function (investment, protection or 
stabilisation), although some areas can be more directly linked to one of the three social 
functions. Typically, protection of human capital during adverse periods enables former 
investments made in human capital to be preserved. 
For instance, unemployment benefits can function as protection (by providing the actual 
benefits) but also as investment (by preparing future labour market prospects through 
effective targeted activation measures and preservation of human capital during 
unemployment spells) and can also play a key role in automatic stabilisation. 
Furthermore, active inclusion policies refer to a protective pillar (adequate minimum 
incomes) and an investment pillar (access to quality services), alongside a labour market 
pillar (inclusive labour market measures). Pensions have a key protection function and 
also help stabilise household incomes and internal demand in recessions, while also 
having a social investment aspect, in that they help older people maintain themselves in a 
state of independence. Likewise, the provision of healthcare, while having a key  
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protection function, also fulfils a crucial investment function that aims at the early 
detection and prevention of diseases, such as cancer screening, 
While there is thus no exclusive correspondence between the various social policies (or 
risks
9) and the three functions of investment, protection and stabilisation, specific social 
policies can however be more specifically linked to one of these functions, depending in 
particular on their design, on the specificities of national contexts and 
circumstances in time. For instance, preserving human capital, the family’s relation to 
the economy and the link to employment can generally be more directly linked to the 
social investment function (Vandenbroucke et al. 2011), relating more particularly the 
social investment dimension to some policies such as childcare, active labour market 
policies, rehabilitation, education or training. 
Nevertheless, the expected returns from specific policies also depend on the national 
contexts and sequencing. For instance, the impact of childcare provision on the 
employment rates of women can depend on labour market factors such as the institutional 
labour market context (e.g., availability of part-time contracts and flexible working time 
arrangements) and in particular gender equality. Likewise, reforms to rebalance social 
spending, for instance, between old-age and childcare and unemployment benefits and to 
revise the design of unemployment benefits in specific countries (e.g., through greater 
activation measures, reducing work disincentives by aligning tax/benefit policies, etc.)  
are also expected to achieve efficiency gains in terms of both economic and social 
effects. 
For instance, in some southern European countries (ES, IT, EL, PT) the stabilising 
impact of social expenditures is relatively weak. These countries also acknowledge a low 
poverty reduction impact (excluding pensions) of social expenditures and low levels of 
childcare provision. Given the rigid constraints on public finances, a careful rebalancing 
of expenditure, most often rather than an increase, would help to reinforce both the 
poverty reduction impact of social benefits, as well as the investment in childcare and the 
stabilising effect of expenditures. This could include reviewing the structure of spending, 
currently skewed towards old age benefits (in comparison to other countries), making 
sure that unemployment insurance covers the most vulnerable workers (those who are 
first to lose their jobs), or adjusting the design of schemes to make them more responsive 
to the economic cycle (e.g., automatic adjustment of the duration of unemployment 
benefits). 
A revision of the mix between cash and in-kind benefits can also lead to efficiency gains. 
Both cash and in-kind benefits have pros and cons and an optimal choice depends on the 
type of benefit and national circumstances. In-kind family benefits such as childcare are 
more employment-friendly than cash family benefits and ease the participation of women 
into the labour market, generating virtuous effects on female employment. Childcare 
services also contribute to preventing child poverty and the intergenerational 
transmission of disadvantage by securing parental incomes and giving access to quality 
education and care to all children. Cash housing benefits are more efficient in cushioning 
situations of temporary financial distress, while in-kind housing benefits can hamper 
workers’ mobility and create ghetto effects. 
Promoting an ‘active’ welfare state should also contribute to the well-functioning cyclical 
behaviour of social spending, whereby expenditures increase more in response to a 
shock, and then decrease in times of recovery. This is an essential aspect of the 
                                                 
9   Such as unemployment, old age and survivors pensions, healthcare, sickness, disability, family, housing and social assistance.  
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sustainability of social systems. A recent study shows that countries that invested heavily 
in active labour market policies (ALMPs) before the crisis saw their employment levels 
less severely impacted during the crisis.
10 During the years 2000-2010, a number of 
countries (the Nordic countries, Germany and the Netherlands, for example) engaged in 
successful reforms to modernise their welfare states, aimed at reabsorbing high levels of 
long-term unemployment and/or swelling numbers of people on long-term illness or 
disability benefits resulting from the recession of the 1990s. 
Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of education systems (accompanied by 
demand-side policies such as enhanced research and development (R&D) spending and 
innovation) is a key priority for increasing human capital and boosting productivity. 
Some proposed interventions do not entail higher spending, while at the same time 
increase future returns from human capital investments. Depending on the country, such 
interventions may include: curricula reforms in primary and secondary schools to 
improve basic and traversal schools; promotion of vocational, scientific and 
technological education with a greater responsiveness to the labour market and attention 
to innovative sectors; modernising assessment processes and wider use of standardised 
exams; and avoiding early tracking of students
11 
12. 
More cost-effective provision and use of health services can also be done through better 
health promotion and disease prevention in and outside the health sector; creating 
financial incentives to encourage patients to register with a general practitioner (GP) or 
family doctor and using a referral system; use of less expensive equivalent (generic) 
drugs; ensuring a balanced mix of staff skills and anticipating staff needs due to ageing; 
promoting the cost-effective use of medicines; reducing the unnecessary use of specialist 
and hospital care while improving primary healthcare services; improving data collection 
and using available information to underpin the improvement of the performance of 
health systems; and using health technology assessment more systematically for 
decision-making processes.
13 
3.  LONG-TERM TRENDS 
3.1   An ageing population 
People in the EU are fortunate to have a life expectancy among the highest in the world. 
This is a great achievement. This century-long trend seems set to continue, with life 
expectancy increasing by about a year every five years. 
Fertility dropped from 2-3 children per woman in the 1960s to well below the population 
replacement level (2.1 births per woman) in the 1990s. Then, in the past decade or so, 
fertility started rising again in most Member States. There are signs that it could rise 
further, to just below the replacement level.
14 Moreover, low fertility rates in past years 
have resulted in smaller cohorts of women (and men), so even somewhat higher rates 
                                                 
10   OECD (2012) Employment Outlook 
11   European Commission Communication - Rethinking Education: Investing in skills for better socio-economic outcomes. 
COM(2012) 669 final 
12   European Commission Communication - Efficiency and equity in European education and training systems, COM(2006) 481 
final 
13   European Commission Staff  Working Document – Investing in Health SWD(2013) 43 
14   The apparent fertility increase in most EU Member States since around 2000 may be simply due to women having children 
progressively later in their lives, as they extended their education; rebalancing in the number of children per woman also 
contributed to the effect. According to this view, fertility has stabilised (already) in the EU — after decreasing from its high 
values in the 1960s— at a level slightly below 2 children per woman.    
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would result in lower numbers of births as compared to some decades ago. That would 
mean that rapid ageing and rising dependency
15 will occur, and in the long run the 
population will shrink — bar a large influx of migrants. As evidenced in the 2012 Ageing 
Report, Labour supply is projected to contract by 11.7% between 2020 and 2060, 
equivalent to 27.7 million people (24 million compared with the 2010 level).
16  
 
This will create challenges for economic growth and welfare in two respects:  
•  First, with more dependents and fewer workers, financing social policies will 
become more difficult. 
•  Secondly, with fewer workers, some economic activities will have to be 
rationalised; unless work-efficient alternatives are found, staffing social services 
will become more difficult. 
Figure 3.1 — Population by sex and age group and working status, EU-27, 2010 
and 2030
17 
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However, a significant part of the longer lives are not lived in good health, as measured 
by the healthy life years (HLY) indicator (see Figure below). There is an average 
difference of 14.3 years between life expectancy and healthy life years for men, and 19.5 
years for women. The spread of values for HLY at birth among EU member states are 
much greater than for life expectancy, being 19 years for women and 18 years for men
18.  
                                                 
15   Dependency comes in different forms, including 'demographic dependency', i.e., the number of people outside the working age 
(20-64 in the EU) divided by the number of those of working age; and 'economic dependency', i.e., the ratio between people not 
in employment over people in employment. 
16   European Commission (2012) Ageing report. 
17  Source: Eurostat and DG EMPL. The projections are based on the assumption of constant employment rates per each age, sex, 
origin (EU-27 or non-EU-27) and education level (ISCED 0-2; 3-4; and 5-6); education attainment rates are assumed to continue 
increasing in line with the trend of the past five years. 
18   See European Commission-OECD Health at a glance: Europe 2012  
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Figure 3.2 — Life expectancy (LE) and healthy life years (HLY) at birth by gender, 
2008-2010 Average 
 
3.2   A trend towards a more active society 
Rising average ages are accompanied by rising life expectancies. From a societal 
viewpoint, this is important, as older people can remain active and independent for 
longer. 
In the past decade, national pension systems have been reformed
19 and more older people 
have stayed involved in work and society. These were major achievements of what we 
call active ageing policies. At the same time, more women have entered the labour 
market while fertility has increased, albeit slowly, showing that policies to reconcile 
work and family life can work. These gains, together with increased immigration, have 
contributed to employment and economic growth
20 and partly offset the challenge of 
ageing. Figure 2.2 below illustrates these trends. 
                                                 
19   See European Commission White Paper -An Agenda for Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions - COM(2012) 55 final 
20   In 2000-2010 EU-27 employment grew by almost 1% per year, which was half the real GDP increase.   
10 
Figure 3.3 — Employment rates by age group and gender, EU-27, 2000-2011 
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3.3   Geographic trends and growing regional imbalances 
With 10 new Member States joining the EU in 2004 and two more in 2007, more people 
are on the move. Growing numbers of people from the new EU-12 Member States 
choose to live in a different country in the EU-27. Their ranks increased almost ten-fold 
from 2000 to 2010, to 4.5 million.
21 Young adults from the EU-12 brought extra 
manpower to the EU-15, relieving saturated labour markets and gaining valuable 
experience. Over the same period, there was a slight rise in the number of EU-15 
nationals living abroad permanently, though there are signs that more and more of them 
move abroad for short periods.
22 
A recent study indicates that people moving from the EU-2 (Bulgaria and Romania) 
during 2004-2009 may have increased aggregate EU-27 GDP by about 0.2% in the short 
term and 0.3% in the long term.
23 The study finds that for the receiving EU-15 countries, 
the long-term impact is even stronger (0.4%), exceeding the economic loss in the sending 
countries. 
The downside of mobility is the cost for sending countries. For Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Romania, this has meant losing about 5 %
24 of their population in the past 
decade, a trend expected to continue for the next 20 years.
25 The losses will be heaviest 
among young adults (a one-third loss) and highly-skilled workers. Though these 
populations are currently among the youngest in the EU, especially Romania, by 2050-
2060 they will all rank among the oldest. This is also a result of a long process of de-
industrialisation following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it will further exacerbate 
existing inequalities among Europe's regions. Closing the large decentralised industrial 
plants, mostly in rural regions, that were artificially supported in the times of planned 
                                                 
21   Including only people aged 15 and over. Source: Eurostat, Labour Force survey, special query.  
22   See European Commission (2010) Demography report, pages 91-92 
(http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=502&newsId=1007&furtherNews=yes) 
23   See European Commission (2011) Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements on Free Movement of  Workers 
from Bulgaria and Romania  
24    And possibly more, according to preliminary indications from censuses around 2011. 
25   See "Population and social conditions" in Eurostat Statistics in focus — 1/2010 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-10-001/EN/KS-SF-10-001-EN.PDF   
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economies has created an exodus towards the cities, especially among young adults in 
search of employment. Those who leave face difficult conditions at the margins in cities, 
while those who stay behind experience an aged and declining population and a weaker 
economy. 
People in rural regions are likely to suffer the most from population decline and ageing. 
These are caught in a vicious cycle where population loss and ageing discourages 
investment; as a result, talented young adults are even more motivated to move to more 
developed regions. Many emigrating young adults care for dependent people in need of 
assistance, such as children or elderly relatives. When these dependent people also move, 
they often face integration problems (such as learning a language in new school); when 
they are left behind, they often lack the necessary care. 
But the impact is not limited to the rural areas. In northern and western Europe, the 
employment rate in urban areas is below the national average. This leads to an 'urban 
paradox'. People arrive to job-rich city centres for work, but the resident population 
suffers from a lack of jobs. High unemployment among residents further puts pressure on 
social cohesion in cities and is a contributing factor in social problems such as inadequate 
housing, crime and delinquency. 
3.4   More diverse populations, a more diverse workforce, more diverse lives 
The working-age population is shrinking, but it is also becoming more diverse. At the 
same time, by 2030, the rate of women's participation in the workforce is expected to 
grow only marginally. The participation of older workers will grow more rapidly (those 
aged 50-64, to increase from 30 to over 35%) and that of workers with a foreign 
background
26 will increase considerably (see Figure 3.3). A greater number of older 
workers will also mean further adaptations in the workplace.
27  
                                                 
26   Persons have a foreign background if they themselves or at least one of their parents were born abroad. 
27   See Council Declaration on the European Year for Active Ageing and Solidarity 
between Generations (2012): The Way Forward  http://europa.eu/ey2012/BlobServlet?docId=9231&langId=en  
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Figure 3.4 — Share of population with a foreign background, EU-27
28 
 
Non EU-citizens have represented two-thirds of the EU population growth in the past 
decade
29 and half of employment growth in the past five years.
30 As a result, out of just 
over 30 million non-nationals in the various EU Member States, 20 million are non-EU 
citizens. Up to 10-15 million more people were born as non-EU citizens and later 
acquired citizenship of an EU Member State. 
Migrants from outside the EU are generally younger than the population they join, so 
they rejuvenate it. These migrants also tend to be better educated than older workers, 
though they are generally less well educated than local-born labour market entrants,
31 so 
they play a more significant role in maintaining the size of the labour force than in up-
skilling it.
32  
There are also country-specific aspects to increasing diversity. The Roma, for instance, 
are projected to increase from 5 % to 16 % of the Hungarian population of active age by 
2050.
33 As low education and low employment are characteristics of many Roma at 
present, fostering their integration is a priority. 
People’s lives are also becoming more varied. The traditional pattern whereby people, 
predominantly men, first studied, then worked, then retired is slowly being supplanted. 
People, especially women, tend to stay in education longer and wait longer before having 
children. Within their working lives, many people have spells of childcare and lifelong 
learning, reducing or discontinuing work temporarily.
34 People still migrate for long 
                                                 
28   See also G. Lanzieri, ‘Fewer, older and multicultural? A projection of the populations of the European Union Member States by 
foreign/national background’. Paper for the European Population Conference, Vienna, 1-4 September 2010  
http://epc2010.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=100315 
29   Eurostat, demo_gind 
30   Eurostat, lfsa_egan 
31   See European Commission (2010), Demography report "Older, more numerous and diverse Europeans" chapter I.5 and II.2. 
32   See OECD (2012) International Migration Outlook, page 127. 
33   See Hablicsek, L (2004)  'Demographics of population ageing in Hungary' Discussion Paper No.207  Project on 
Intergenerational Equity, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University  
34   Vlachantoni, A. (2010), The demographic characteristics and economic activity patterns of carers over 50: evidence from the 
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, Population Trends Nr. 141, pp. 54-96.  
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periods, but now many more have short work or study experiences abroad.
35 People are 
also leaving the labour market later. These new, more varied patterns of life mean that 
social protection systems have to adapt to the new realities. 
3.5   Changing family structures 
In recent decades, ever-growing numbers of women have been getting an education and 
going out to work. Among those born after 1960, more women than men obtain 
university degrees in almost all EU Member States. Each new generation of women has 
valued employment and economic independence more and managed to reconcile having 
children with employment more successfully. Those who work as young adults are also 
more likely to be working as they grow older, with employment rates growing for 
women of all ages. 
Changes in values, opportunities and increasing mobility have led and continue to lead to 
changing family structures. Since 1970, there have been fewer marriages, falling from 
eight to five a year per thousand people, while the number of divorces has risen from one 
to two per thousand.
36 This has probably increased the number of single-parent and 
recomposed families. More children, now over a third, are born outside marriage. At the 
same time, fewer women (traditional informal carers) are available to look after 
dependants as demographic dependency rises. Overall, the male breadwinner model, on 
which much family policy has been grounded, is no longer predominant. This means 
adapting social policies to a new reality, ranging from pensions, education and care, 
health and elderly care and measures to reconcile work and private life.
37 
3.6   The development of information and communications technologies 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are increasingly being used across 
Member States. In 2011, 77 % of households in the EU had access to a computer. The 
internet was available in 73 % of EU households in 2011, a sharp rise from 41% in 
2004.
38 An estimated 180 million people are also using ICTs at work.
39 
In spite of increasing levels of regular internet usage in Europe, large disparities still 
persist between EU countries and between different socio-economic groups. Age and 
education are the main factors determining the probability of using the internet. Other 
socio-economic conditions such as household income or rural/urban living area also 
strongly influence internet use.
40 
Furthermore, when looking at young people, according to Eurostat, in 2011, 91% were 
regular internet users, or accessed the internet at least once a week. However, research on 
the relationship between youth, ICT and inclusion
41 points to worrying trends: (a) the 
lack of ICT skills of young people, for example digital reading or ICT skills to meet the 
labour market demands; (b) the fact that socio-economic status affects the frequency of 
ICT use, the skills and the types of ICT uses, where disadvantaged youth adopt more 
                                                 
35   See the special Eurobarometer EBs337  Geographical and labour market mobility published in June 2010 and EBs346 New 
Europeans published in April 2011 at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_en.htm  
36   See European Commission (2010) Demography report 
37   See http://www.coe.int/t/e/social_cohesion/population/N%B049_Family_Formation.pdf  
38   Eurostat, Survey on ICT usage in households and by individuals 
39   Council of European Professional Informatics Societies (2007) 'Thinking Ahead on e-Skills for the ICT Industry in Europe' 
40   European Commission (2012)  Digital Agenda Scoreboard, Chapter 1: A vibrant digital single market 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/KKAH12001ENN-chap2-PDFWEB-2.pdf 
41   JRC (2013) Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for disadvantaged youth: Opportunities and Challenges. 
Evidence from literature and practice. Policy Report. Authors: C Centeno, J Cullen, S Kluzer, A Hache (forthcoming 2013), 
JRC Scientific and Technical Reports Series, EUR NN NNN EN, at http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/EAP/eInclusion/youth.html  
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risky behaviours online and are more likely to be exposed to unsuitable and harmful on-
line experiences; and (c) digital exclusion of those with lower socio-economic status is 
affected by cost, peer pressure, social context, attitudes, and school divides. 
 
The development and increasing use of ICTs has the potential to promote cultural 
understanding between citizens, to seed innovation in institutions and to create 
competitive advantage for businesses and employees in the future. These technologies 
continue to play an important role in improving labour productivity and they also provide 
responses to major societal challenges.  ICTs increase the effectiveness of existing 
processes and create enormous potential through 'network effects' ('collective 
intelligence') in order to find effective solutions to societal challenges. 
ICTs are a key enabling tool in the development of new forms of work. Thanks to their 
pervasiveness, people can work remotely, on the go from virtual work stations and 
indeed also according to their own rhythm. This flexibility allows workers to take up 
employment positions which otherwise would have been too far away or not compatible 
with other personal obligations such as child or elderly care or with limitations in 
activities imposed by a disability. 
 
The ICT sector has increasingly accounted for a substantial part of EU GDP and 
employment. For the EU as a whole, in 2009, the EU ICT sector represented 4.0% of EU 
GDP (€ 470 billion) and accounted for 2.7% total employment, amounting to 6.1 million 
people.
42 
ICT skills have become crucial for employability of individuals, supporting individual 
empowerment (development of self-confidence and self-efficacy) and the development of 
other skills, such as transversal skills (social networking, collaboration, problem solving, 
language skills), job search skills, and e-learning skills.
43 
There is also an increasing demand in the labour market for ICT skills, which not only 
increases the employability of those having them, but also gives people access to more 
and better jobs — more creative jobs where they can further develop their skills, enhance 
their career prospects and earn higher wages. Moreover, ICT skills facilitate access to the 
labour market as they help people to search for jobs more effectively and can reduce the 
duration of unemployment. 
Furthermore, ICTs have dramatically changed the way job seekers look for jobs and 
employers recruit and select the best candidates. ICTs support the role of labour market 
intermediaries (social actors, employment services, etc.) that can offer new online 
assessment, labour market information and employment services to job seekers and 
employers, improving service quality, cost-effectiveness, supply-demand matching and 
reach.
44 
Demand for ICT specialists and people who have strong ICT skills is growing, while 
shortages of ICT practitioner skills have become endemic. The employment of ICT 
practitioners is growing so fast that there are not enough workers to fill all the vacancies 
available in the sector, even with increased unemployment during the economic crisis. 
                                                 
42   JRC (2012) The 2012 Predict Report An Analysis of ICT R&D in the EU and Beyond 
43   JRC (2013) Literature Review on Employability, Inclusion and ICT, Report 2: ICT and Employability. Authors: de Hoyos M., 
Green A. E., Barnes S-A., Behle H., Baldauf B., and Owen D. Editors: Centeno C., Stewart J. JRC Technical Report Series EUR 
NN NNN EN, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, Joint Research Centre, European Commission (forthcoming 
2013), at http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/EAP/eInclusion/employability.html 
44   Op. cit.  
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According to recent estimates,
45 there will be up to 700,000 unfilled ICT practitioners' 
vacancies in the EU by the year 2015. The Employment Package underlines the potential 
for employment growth by developing the ICT sector and ICT skills.
46 
Outside of ICT specialist skills, most jobs nowadays already require some kind of 
computer-related knowledge. It is forecast that by 2015, 90% of jobs will need at least 
basic computer skills.
47 Possessing ICT skills is increasingly important in order to lower 
unemployment risks even among senior workers,
48 and ICTs can also be used to improve 
other work skills. ICTs can help increase high level skills and up-skill existing skills, for 
example, by enabling education and training through open and easily available learning 
resources, open educational practices and the use of open networks. 
 
When exploring the links between ICT and the social inclusion of disadvantaged 
populations, an analysis of 61 initiatives using ICT to support the inclusion of 
disadvantage youth at risk of exclusion
49 shows that the short term effects or 'outcome' of 
ICT-based initiatives are associated with multi-dimensional impacts, typically combining 
empowering/skilling, social inclusion and social capital and employment-related benefits, 
supporting protective factors and resilience. 
 
4.  THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS: DIVERGENCE 
BETWEEN  MEMBER  STATES AND GROWING INEQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
In the decade before the crisis, economic and employment growth in general improved 
overall living standards. Many governments devoted more resources to social policy 
intervention. Despite the clear redistributive effect of social protection, inequalities have 
often increased. Poverty and social exclusion remain major issues in most EU countries, 
though the pattern varies substantially across different countries. 
The outbreak of the financial and economic crisis in late 2008 put further strain on 
households in the EU. The timid recovery generating some employment growth after 
2010 has not proved durable and the ensuing economic slowdown in 2011 gradually 
turned into mild recession in the EU, as the escalation of the debt crisis in several 
Member States led to necessary policy shifts toward fiscal austerity by and large across 
the EU, with inevitable adverse effects on aggregate demand. As a result, the 
employment recovery from the 2008-2009 recession has come to a standstill. The number 
of people in employment in the EU grew by a modest 0.3 % of the working-age 
population in 2011, owing to the better first half of that year, and then has stagnated until 
autumn 2012. 
                                                 
45   Report for the European Commission “Anticipating the Evolution of the Supply and Demand of e-Skills in Europe (2010-2015)” 
Empirica and IDC Europe, December 2009. Updated forecast presented at the European e-Skills Conference held in Brusselson 
13 December 2011. 
46   See European Commission Communication -Towards a Job Rich Recovery, COM(2012) 173 final 
47   IDC White Paper (2009) Post Crisis: e-Skills Are Needed to Drive Europe's Innovation Society 
48
    For example, one econometric study of the Italian labour market, monitoring for age and education and following individuals 
over time, found that low educated workers aged between 35 and 49 with no digital skills have a 5% higher risk of being 
unemployed than those with digital skills; and highly-educated 50-64 workers with no digital skills have a 20% higher risk of 
being unemployed than those with digital skills. The dataset used provides four different waves of data (2000, 2002, 2004, and 
2006). For the illustration of the dataset see Main Report (Codagnone et al 2009), point 8.2. 
49 
  JRC (2013) Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for disadvantaged youth: Opportunities and 
Challenges.Evidence from literature and practice. Policy Report. Authors: C Centeno, J Cullen, S Kluzer, A Hache (forthcoming 
2013), JRC Scientific and Technical Reports Series, EUR NN NNN EN, at: 
 http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/EAP/eInclusion/youth.html  
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Over the period 2008-2011, the employed population shrank by 2.0 %. Unemployment is 
again rising to historically high levels. The average EU unemployment rate is over 10 %. 
The rates for long-term and youth unemployment are especially worrying. In autumn 
2012, 25 million Europeans were unemployed. More than 10 million of them had been 
unemployed for over a year, while in the United States and Japan unemployment has 
been slowly declining. 
4.1.  Growing divergence between EU countries 
Employment and social indicators point to growing divergence among EU countries. 
Some southern and peripheral European countries have seen their unemployment 
increase sharply and their GDP contract considerably, while most of the countries of 
northern and central Europe have so far shown greater resilience. The latter tend to 
combine higher levels of competitiveness with better functioning labour markets and 
more robust welfare systems. The (in)ability to cope with the shock was frequently 
compounded by the initial public debt and deficit levels, as well as the property market 
situation, and subsequent developments followed by the reaction of financial markets. 
EU countries have seen very different trends in unemployment, as shown in Figure 3.2. 
After converging in the years up to 2003-2004, in favour of southern and peripheral 
countries, it changed in favour of northern countries again in 2008, both within and 
outside the euro area. In 2011, the gap between the north and the south/periphery in the 
euro area reached 7.7 percentage points, but was smaller among non-Euro area countries 
(1.8 %). Labour market divergence has become a major issue for the EU. 
Figure 4.1 —  Diverging unemployment rates by groups of Member States since 
2000, 15-74 age group, 2000-2011 
 
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS.  
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Much of the post-2008 period in most Member States has been marked by wage 
deceleration, including pay freezes and sometimes pay cuts. In 2011, this deceleration 
was increasingly concentrated in Member States with high unemployment and current 
account deficits, in efforts to reduce the wage bill in the public sector and regain 
competitiveness in the private sector. Changes in pay per employee ranged between plus 
3 % in Finland, Belgium and Germany and a similar rate of negative growth in Greece. 
Figure 4.2 — Compensation per employee, productivity and ULC in 2011 (annual 
% growth)
50 
 
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts 
There is growing divergence between the countries where the social impacts of the crisis 
were somewhat limited, and countries where living conditions have deteriorated 
markedly. The fall in household disposable income was most significant (above 4%) in 
the southern countries, Ireland, Hungary and the Baltic States, the result of further 
deterioration in labour market conditions, together with weakening of the cushioning 
impact of social expenditure over time (see Figure 4.3).  
In the Baltic States the rebound of the economic and labour market situation has 
contributed to stabilising income levels overall after 2010, but long-term unemployment 
and poverty remain at high levels. 
In stark contrast, northern and continental countries fared far better. The combined effect 
of robust automatic stabilisers
51 (reinforced by initial discretionary measures) and more 
resilient labour markets in general helped mitigate the impact of the recession on overall 
household incomes and private demand. Still, while household incomes continued to rise 
during the crisis, there were still some groups badly affected by rising unemployment. 
Between 2007 and 2009, automatic stabilisers and stimulus packages contributed to 
sustaining household incomes in most countries. Between 2009 and 2011, household 
incomes fell in a number of countries, especially where the recession was prolonged, due 
                                                 
50   Unit labour cost (ULC) growth = growth compensation per employee adjusted for productivity growth Note: IE: data missing, 
LV: structural break in data 
51   'Automatic stabilisers' refers to mechanisms that stabilise economic growth, notably through the stabilisation of households' 
incomes (through higher social benefits such as unemployment benefits, and lower taxation in the event of negative shock) so as 
to cushion consumption and savings and thus the overall economic cycle.  
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to: the weakening of the effect of automatic stabilisers (e.g. people losing entitlement) 
and the phasing out of discretionary measures taken at the onset of the crisis, combined 
with the introduction of fiscal consolidation measures (cuts in benefits and increases in 
taxes). 
Figure 4.3 — Evolution of Gross Household Disposable Income (GHDI) in real 
terms (2005=100) 2005-2011 (2012 forecast)
52 
 
Source: AMECO 
 
4.2.  Trends towards greater social inequality in most countries 
The evolution of incomes since 2008 results both from long-term trends
53 and from the 
specific impact of the recession. The initial deterioration of labour market conditions 
primarily affected workers at the lower end or in the middle of the income distribution. 
This impact was mitigated by the working of automatic stabilisers and initial 
discretionary measures. Over time, long-term unemployment and the weakening of the 
protective role of social transfers led to an increase in the share of people on low income 
in a number of countries. In addition (see section 7) fiscal consolidation measures have 
had differing redistributive impacts, in some cases exacerbating and in some cases 
mitigating inequality.  
The crisis has not affected the whole population uniformly. It has in several respects 
worsened the position of people already at heightened risk, thus contributing to social 
polarisation. Young people have been particularly hard hit, and more than one in five 
active Europeans aged 15-24 are unemployed. Non-nationals, the low-skilled and men 
are also badly affected by deteriorating labour market conditions. There has been a 
levelling down of gender gaps in employment, unemployment, wages and poverty over 
the crisis. This does not, however, reflect progress in gender equality as it is based on 
lower rates of employment, higher rates of unemployment and reduced earnings for both 
men and women. 
                                                 
52   Data available only until 2010 
53   See European Commission (2011) Employment and social developments in Europe 2011, chapters 1 and 2  
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Even before the crisis, there was a trend towards polarisation of incomes. The 
polarisation of jobs took root in the decade before the crisis. Most of the jobs created 
between 1998 and 2007 were either low paid or highly paid
54. This led to slow erosion of 
the number of middle-paid jobs (Figure 3.5). The growth of service jobs at the extremes 
of the wage distribution aggravated this trend. 
The recession reinforced the wage polarisation observed in the past. During the current 
recession, the massive job losses in manufacturing and construction — and the ensuing 
collapse in middle-ranking jobs — drove wage polarisation for the most part. Job growth 
in the top wage quintile persisted strongly throughout the recession, mainly because of 
the rise of knowledge-intensive services (KIS), including public services (mainly 
education and health) and private services (business services). One of the main factors 
behind the "disappearing middle" was the polarisation of service sector employment, 
characterised mainly by employment growth at the top and bottom, which is likely to 
continue in the long run. This suggests that the service sector cannot be relied upon to fill 
the gap created by the decline in manufacturing. This trend toward further segregation 
means that those in lower-end employment are at growing risk of limited career 
mobility possibilities, exacerbating problems of job-skills mismatches and over-
qualification. 
 
Figure 4.4 — Net job creation (difference between the number of jobs created and 
the number of jobs lost — expressed in thousands of jobs) by wage level 
  Before the crisis   During the crisis 
Source: ESDE 2011 
Another factor driving rising inequalities is the growth in involuntary part-time and 
temporary contracts. Persistent labour market segmentation is an important 
determinant of growing earnings inequality, not just because non-standard workers tend 
to work fewer hours per year, but also because they are generally paid less per hour after 
taking into account differences in education and experience. Non-standard contracts can 
also provide opportunities to get back into the labour market and act as stepping stones 
towards better jobs, as observed in countries with better functioning labour markets.
55 
                                                 
54   See European Commission (2011)  Employment and social developments in Europe 2011, chapter 1 
55   European Commission (2011) Employment and social developments in Europe 2011, chapter 4  
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In most countries, inequalities between workers were further aggravated by the 
polarisation of jobs between job-rich and job-poor households. Before the crisis, 
growth in employment was mainly driven by women entering the labour market. The 
new jobs mostly went to second earners in households that previously had only one 
earner. Households that included no earners were benefiting less. This is illustrated 
in the graph below, which shows that while the EU unemployment rate was reduced by 2 
percentage points between 2004 and 2007, the share of people in jobless households was 
reduced by only 1 percentage point. 
Figure 4.5 — Employment, unemployment and share of working age adults living in 
jobless households, EU-27, 2000-2011 
 
Source: Eurostat — LFS 
Welfare systems play an important redistributive role, but in the past decade, government 
transfers, the tax system and public services have not always been able to mitigate the 
rise in earnings inequalities (see ESDE 2012). Moreover, the current need for fiscal 
consolidation and the growing pressure of an ageing population are putting European 
welfare systems under stress, so there need to be efficiency gains.  
The effect of the first phase of the crisis (2008-2009) was uneven across the income 
distribution. In a third of the EU countries the impact was regressive. In Ireland, Spain 
and Lithuania, the poorest segment of the population saw their income drop more than 
the rest of the population. In France, Denmark, Sweden and Slovenia, the incomes of the 
poorest segment of the population grew significantly less than households higher up the 
income distribution. In the UK, Hungary and Italy, people in the middle of the income 
distribution (often workers) were the most affected by the crisis. In a few countries of 
continental Europe (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Poland) the trend 
was relatively even across the distribution. In Latvia, Greece and Portugal, the impact 
was progressive, with the top incomes proportionally more affected than those of the rest 
of the population.  
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Figure 4.6 — Changes in households' disposable income in different parts of the 
income distribution (% change in national currencies, 2007-2009); Member States 
grouped according to the degree of progressivity of the change 
 
Source: EU-SILC 
 
Consumer surveys
56 provide a more recent picture (up to spring 2012) of the trends in the 
way households themselves see their financial situation. The financial stress index 
monitors the percentage of people declaring that they had to draw on their savings or to 
go into debt to keep up current expenses. Trends up to spring 2012 show that most 
households saw a marked deterioration in their financial situation in most EU countries. 
All income groups were affected. 
However, in some countries, those on low incomes felt the impact most, especially in 
Estonia, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Portugal and Slovakia. 
This could herald significant rises in poverty and material deprivation levels in these 
countries and confirm the increase in subjective poverty that surveys recorded in the 
first phase of the crisis. According to data from EU-SILC, between 2008 and 2011, the 
proportion of people reporting that their household was only just making ends meet rose 
sharply (by more than 4 percentage points) in the Baltic States, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary 
and Ireland.. This includes countries where the poor may have lost proportionally less 
than the rich (see above), but nevertheless experience a stronger deterioration of their 
actual living conditions given that essential consumption items (food, housing) represent 
a larger share of their budgets. 
                                                 
56   Consumer surveys carried out under the joint harmonised EU programme of business and consumer surveys  
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Figure 4.7 — Reported financial distress in households by income quartile in the EU 
and in selected Member States (2000-2012)
57 
 
Source: Joint harmonised EU consumer surveys & DG EMPL calculations 
5.  THE EVOLUTION OF POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION  
5.1.  The multiple facets of poverty and social exclusion 
This section deals with trends in poverty and social exclusion in the EU. EU-SILC data 
confirm the stagnation of relative poverty between 2005 and 2011, but at the same time 
show that living standards improved in EU-12 countries before the crisis, as measured by 
severe material deprivation rates.
58 Material deprivation rates eased in EU-12 countries in 
parallel with the relative rise in GDP per capita in these countries. The crisis has brought 
this overall improving trend to a halt and material deprivation started increasing again in 
many countries, especially those most affected by the crisis.
59 
The impact of the crisis is most visible in the percentage of jobless households
60. This 
has started to rise again since 2008, especially in the EU-15 (see next section). Related 
and significant income losses are also reflected in the increase in material deprivation in 
some countries (up to 2010-11). 
                                                 
57   Time series smoothed by applying Hodrick-Prescott filter 
58   "Material deprivation" covers indicators relating to economic strain, durables, housing and environment of the dwelling. 
59   Eurostat, EU-SILC, ilc_mddd11 
60   Note: Jobless households (JLH) refers to people living in households with very low work intensity (LWI) by age and sex 
(population aged 0 to 59 years). In this document both the abbreviations JLH and LWI are used to cover the same indicator.     
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Figure 5.1 — Population at risk of poverty and social exclusion in the EU and in 
selected Member States 
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Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC 2011, 2010 data for Ireland.  
Figure 5.2 — Developments in the at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) 
rate and its components in the EU, 2005-2011 
 
Source: Eurostat, EU SILC. Note: 2005, 2006 and 2011 are Eurostat estimates. 
Poor  health, lack of access to health care, poor or unaffordable housing, poor 
educational outcomes (especially for early school leavers and NEETs
61 ) or poor access 
to education, and the deterioration of social participation are important dimensions of 
social exclusion. The impact of the crisis on these is more difficult to capture, but is 
likely to have long-term detrimental impacts on the formation and quality of human 
capital. However, a recent paper by the Commission’s Social Situation Observatory 
                                                 
61   The term 'NEET' refers to young people who were not in employment, education or training 
EU 27 
AROPE 24%  
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(SSO)
62 finds that the financial crisis has had a statistically significant negative effect on 
health, in the sense of a significant increase in the number of people reporting poor health 
after the crisis (i.e., between 2006 and 2009 in Greece and Portugal). 
Improving access to healthcare is clearly an important aspect of preventing and tackling 
social exclusion. The EU_SILC indicator of ‘unmet need for medical care' (due to 
barriers in access to the health care system
63) improved in most Member States between 
2008 and 2010. While slight deterioration occurred in Finland, France and Malta, Latvia 
and Poland stand out as the only two countries with a marked worsening. The significant 
income gradient has been maintained across the EU in the reference period of 2008-2010. 
More recent information stemming from the annual Social Climate Eurobarometer
64 
surveys carried out between 2009 and 2012 show a clear downward trend in the 
'judgement of the current situation in the health care provision'. The index for Greece 
went down from –3.1 to –6.3 (on the scale from –10 to +10). Important negative changes 
in the 'judgement of the current situation in the health care provision' have also been 
observed in Italy (from –0.1 to –1.8), Latvia (from –1.8 to –2.8) and Portugal (from –1.0 
to –1.9). Generally, the countries scoring poorly are the ones heavily affected by the 
crisis. Yet, the perceptions became only slightly worse in Spain and remained stable in 
Ireland. Improvements were observed in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Poland represents a special case of a country without a GDP decrease and with a sharp 
drop in the judgement of health care provision to very low levels (from –1.7 in 2009 to –
4.0 in 2012). See the Staff Working Document on Investing in Health for concrete policy 
responses. 
                                                 
62   Economic Recession and Health Outcomes, Research Note, Sotiris Vandoros, Mauricio Avendano-Pabon, Philipp Hessel and 
Tiziana Leone (to be checked with D4 if already published) 
63   The barriers considered are "too expensive, "too long waiting lists" or "too far to travel" 
64   Special Eurobarometers "Social Climate" EBs 315 June 2009, EBs349 June 2010, EBs370 June 2011, EBs391 June 2012, at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_en.htm 
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Figure 5.3 — Self-reported unmet need for medical care
65, by income quintiles in 
selected Member States, 2008-2010 
 
 Source EU SILC 2008 2010 
5.2.  The gender dimension of poverty and exclusion 
Overall, women face a higher risk of poverty and exclusion than men. The crisis has not 
widened this gap so far, since prime age men have been most directly hit by the 
deterioration of labour market conditions. However, some categories of women face 
significantly higher relative risks of poverty — such as lone mothers, inactive women of 
working age (27%), and elderly women over 75 (20.7%). Profiling of populations 
exposed to the risk of poverty show that women are more often represented in groups 
facing higher risks of persistent poverty, linked in particular to inactivity and care 
responsibilities, which have long-term impacts on future pension entitlements. While 
inactivity rates have not increased so far as a consequence of the crisis, retrenchments or 
freezes in social spending may hamper female participation and aggravate the situation of 
the most vulnerable women, depending on which expenditure items are affected (e.g. 
reducing spending on childcare facilities will hamper the labour market participation of 
mothers). 
                                                 
65   This indicator refers to people who declare that they did not seek health care even if they needed it because it was too expensive, 
the waiting list was too long or because it was too far to travel (reasons linked to the organisation of the health care system).  
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Figure 5.4 — Male and female at-risk-of-poverty-and-social exclusion rates, and the 
underlying three components, 2008 and 2011
66 
 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC.  
The greater exposure of women to the risk of poverty and exclusion partly results from 
the combination of three gender gaps. Women's activity rate is still 12.7 percentage 
points below that of men (64.9 % against 77.6 % for the 15-64 age bracket in 2011), 
reflecting persistent gender divisions in household and care responsibilities. A higher 
proportion of women works part-time, which means that on average women work 17.0 % 
less hours than men (33.7 hours per week against 40.6 in 2011). Finally, the gender pay 
gap of 17 % (in average hourly gross wage) is partly due to women earning lower pay for 
work of equal value, and partly due to women being concentrated in jobs that pay less. 
As a result, women's annual gross labour market earnings can be estimated to be 42 
% below those of men on average,
67 resulting in lower GDP, lower social security 
contributions and higher risk of poverty in old age (see ESDE 2012). Older widows are 
particularly at risk, as discussed in section 6.4. 
A large share of women entered the labour market as second earners and thereby 
improved the income situation of households already at work. However, in many 
countries the women who are furthest away from the labour market (lone mothers, the 
low-skilled, etc.) still face major barriers to finding a job due to lack of childcare or care 
for other dependants, or lack of measures to improve the work/life balance. They also 
often have difficulties in finding a job that pays because of involuntary part-time work, 
and the combined effect of high marginal effective tax rates and high costs of childcare. 
Work disincentives for secondary earners due to joint taxation systems in some Member 
States can also exacerbate this. 
 
5.3.  The depth and duration of poverty  
The crisis has increased or is likely to increase the duration and depth of poverty. These 
deteriorations in the persistence and/or depth of poverty constitute a serious challenge for 
Member States, requiring more specific actions to prevent the situation deteriorating 
further and to tackle the deepest roots of poverty. 
                                                 
66   Reference periods for income and activity status for IE and UK  differ from the other countries (where the data refers to the 
previous year). 
67    All data refer to EU-27.  
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While relative poverty remained stable in the EU and in most countries, the poverty 
threshold declined dramatically in a number of countries, reflecting the general decrease 
of household incomes. Between 2008 and 2011, it fell by 17.4 % in Latvia, 12.5 % in 
Lithuania, 10.7 % in Ireland, 8 % in Spain, 7.7 % in the UK, 7 % in Greece and 6.7 % in 
Estonia. This shows that while their relative situation is not deteriorating, people living 
on low incomes are facing a serious reduction of their resources that were already 
considered insufficient to maintain a decent living standard before the crisis. 
Figure 5.5 — Developments in the at-risk-of-poverty indicator from 2008 to 2011 
and the underlying poverty threshold 
   
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC.  
Note: Countries sorted by change in deflated poverty threshold.  
In many countries, the poor are getting poorer as the gap between the median income of 
the poor and the 60 % threshold is increasing (the poverty gap was 23.3 % in 2011, up 
from 21.7 % in 2008). Between 2008 and 2011, the poverty gap increased for all but a 
few Member States and with especially strong rises (around 3 pps or more) in high-
poverty countries such as the Baltic States, Slovakia, Italy and Spain, as well as in some 
countries with a low incidence of poverty (Austria, Denmark).  
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Figure 5.6 — Deepening of the risk of poverty: change in the at-risk-of poverty gap 
2008-2011
68 
 
Source: Eurostat, EU SILC  
 
In 2010, 8.5 % of the working-age individuals were at persistent risk of poverty, 
meaning that they had been at-risk-of-poverty in at least three out of the previous four 
years (including the last one). Persistent poverty is high (10 % or more) in Italy, Greece, 
Portugal, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Ireland. Young adults, inactive or unemployed 
women, lone mothers, or older working-age adults out of the labour market are among 
those facing higher risks of persistent poverty. Typical profiles vary across countries, 
suggesting that these people face specific structural and institutional barriers in different 
countries. 
Figure 5.7 — Persistent risk of poverty compared to risk of poverty, 2010 data
69 
 
Source: Eurostat, EU SILC, ilc_li21 
 
 
                                                 
68   Figures refer to cut-off point: 60% of median equivalised income, white bars indicate declines in the poverty gap and red ones 
increases. 
69   Data for IE, FR are from 2007 (latest available)  
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5.4      The most severe forms of poverty and social exclusion: focus on 
homelessness, the Roma and migrants 
Homelessness often results from a conjunction of adverse personal, structural and 
institutional circumstances. The crisis has had a strong impact on both the gravity and the 
extent of homelessness. There is a growing share of migrants, young people and 
unemployed or low-income people among the homeless. Women, families and elderly 
people are also increasingly seeking shelter. 
The scale of homelessness is very difficult to fully assess, as homeless people do not 
show up in traditional data collection processes such as household surveys. However, 
according to the 2010 Eurobarometer
70 survey more than 3 million Europeans were at the 
time afraid of becoming homeless and nearly three out of four Europeans (73 %) thought 
that homelessness had risen in their country over the last three years up to 2010. 
Data
71 collected by municipal, local or national organisations show a general trend 
towards a growing number of people becoming homeless because of economic hardship. 
Some countries, e.g. the UK, Ireland and Estonia, despite suffering from recession and 
the collapse of the housing bubble, managed to contain the spread of homelessness 
through effective assistance schemes. For a more detailed discussion of the scope and 
severity of homelessness across the EU and its policy implications, see the Staff Working 
Document on homelessness as part of the Social Investment Package. 
Figure 5.8 — Overview of recent trends in the extent of homelessness over the 
past 1-5 years 
Trend reported  Member State  Total 
Increase  AT, CZ, FR, DE, ES, EL, HU, 
IE, IT, LT, PT, PL, SE, SL, , , 
UK (England + Wales) 
15 
Decrease  FI, NL + North Rhine-
Westphalia, Scotland 
2 
No trend identified  RO, LU, BE  3 
Stable  DK  1 
Total number of Member States examined: 21 
Source: FEANTSA Country Report 2012 
 
Ethnic minorities, including the Roma, are not identified in the EU-SILC. However, 
2011 survey data provided by the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), the United 
Nations Development Programme and the World Bank show that Roma experience more 
severe poverty and social exclusion than other groups in the societies in which they live. 
This is due to a complex mix of factors, primarily low educational attainment, low levels 
of employment, significantly worse health status, and poor housing and living conditions. 
Moreover, poverty and social exclusion experienced by Roma is often intensified by 
discriminatory treatment and prejudice. 
                                                 
70   Special Eurobarometer "Poverty and Social Exclusion" EBs355, September 2010, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_en.htm 
71   This section draws on a review of existing data collections by the SSO (http://www.socialsituation.eu/research-
notes/SSO%20RN8%20Homelessness_Final.pdf) and a special focus from the European Commission's June 2012 Employment 
and social situation quarterly review  
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In all 11 EU Member States covered, survey results show that more than 8 out of 10 
Roma surveyed are at risk of poverty. The differences between Roma and non-Roma are 
most marked in France and Italy, where the proportion of Roma living in households at 
risk of poverty is more than twice as high as for non-Roma living in the same geographic 
area. The results are also significant in the countries with the largest Roma communities, 
such as Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria. 
Figure 5.9 — Persons living in households at risk of poverty (%) 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Roma
Non-Roma
Roma
Non-Roma
Roma
Non-Roma
Roma
Non-Roma
Roma
Non-Roma
Roma
Non-Roma
Roma
Non-Roma
Roma
Non-Roma
Roma
Non-Roma
Roma
Non-Roma
Gens du voyage
Non-Roma
B
G
C
Z
H
U
R
O
S
K
E
L
P
L
E
S
P
T
I
T
F
R
 
Source: FRA Roma Pilot Survey (2011), UNDP/World Bank/European Commission 
Regional Roma survey 2011 
Note: Non-Roma here refers to non-Roma living geographically close to areas with a 
concentrated Roma population. 
Migrants and mobile EU people in the European Union face considerable obstacles 
getting jobs and are more often unemployed than native-born populations, especially in 
the case of non-EU born migrants. The linguistic, cultural and labour market 
acclimatisation of migrants can be a long process, hampered yet further by other barriers 
such as discrimination. 
The risk of poverty or exclusion among the migrant population remains much higher than 
among the EU population overall. For people aged 18+ born outside the EU-27, it stood 
at 37.8% in 2011, compared to 20.8% for those born in the country and 22.2% for those 
born in another EU country. Between 2008 and 2010, people born outside the EU have 
seen the sharpest rises in the risk of poverty or exclusion in Spain (a 3 pps increase), 
while in France and Italy, citizens from other EU Member States have been worst 
affected (see ESDE 2012). 
5.5      The economic returns on social investment and the costs of 
unemployment, poverty and social exclusion 
Poverty and social exclusion are linked to adverse health,
72 lower literacy, poor school 
performance for children, higher stress levels for families, and more crime and social 
unrest. Efforts to illustrate or quantify the costs of unemployment, poverty and social 
exclusion generally refer to higher public health care costs, increased policing and crime 
costs, foregone economic activity, lost wages and productivity, lost tax revenues and the 
                                                 
72   European Commission Staff  Working Document – ' Investing in Health' SWD(2013) 43  
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intergenerational costs that flow from the likelihood that a significant number of children 
from disadvantaged families will remain disadvantaged over their lifetimes. Accordingly, 
a comprehensive approach to the costs of unemployment, poverty and social exclusion 
would require a very broad range of effects to be taken into account. 
A first step in this direction can be to focus on the opportunity costs (accounting for the 
direct economic loss in labour market incomes) and the related additional public 
resources (benefits and taxes) rather than on the overall general costs of poverty (for 
instance health and crime outcomes, intergenerational transmission of poverty, or life 
course impacts on children experiencing poverty). 
From this perspective, the gain that some people would experience from having better 
access to the labour market can be reflected in their higher labour market incomes. The 
assessment can reflect the general economic impact (higher individual value added 
translating into higher wages and higher GDP), distinguishing between both the private 
side (higher net incomes) and the public side (fewer benefits and higher tax revenue).
73 
An assessment of the gains associated with the return of people of active age to 
employment can be derived from EU wide surveys such as SILC. This can be obtained 
by directly comparing average labour market outcomes (and related benefits and tax 
levels) of poor and non-poor people having the same characteristics (such as education, 
age, sex, household type) or by relying on matching methods, thus enabling estimates 
that better reflect the heterogeneity of situations, as well as actual assessments of the 
overall impact on poverty rates (linked to possible changes in the median incomes).
74 
                                                 
73   It can be noted that such an approach remains however partial. From an economic point of view, it notably disregards the 
multiplier impact of additional private consumption or additional public investment, as well as the impact of possible overall 
lower taxes or public debt. It also doesn't reflect the potential change in the take-up of some in-kind benefits – such as child care 
or health – and neither changes in the payments of employers’ contributions or indirect taxes such as VAT. 
74   This type of approach may also be used for other types of social protection and social inclusion policies, for instance, providing 
estimates on the return of child care facilities, or on changes in marginal tax rates for different types of situation (for instance for 
pension take-up or second earners).  
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Figure 5.10 — Estimates of the opportunity cost for the poor and unemployed aged 
25-59 (size of the population and gains in % GDP)
75 
Size as % the population           Gains as a % of GDP 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2010 — SSO calculations.  
Note : 'size' refers to the number of people affected (i.e., poor unemployed people who 
are coming back to work), or in other words the shock expressed as a % of total 
population or total poor population. 'Gains' refers to the opportunity costs of poverty (or 
gains of moving out of poverty), associated with the corresponding shock (as a % of 
GDP). 
For instance, the impact of poor unemployed people getting jobs is estimated to account 
for around 1% of GDP in some Member States and to 0.5% of GDP or more in over half 
of the Member States (see Figure 5.10). Relying on micro-simulation tools, such as 
Euromod would enable more accurate estimates to be made, since actual changes in 
benefits and tax levels could be accounted for after changes in attachment to the labour 
market, through simulations of employment shocks (for instance among the working 
poor, or the unemployed or inactive poor). 
Estimations of the return from measures to encourage people into jobs could be derived 
from an assessment of the economic gains if some categories of poor people get jobs, by 
comparing estimates of the cost and efficiency of various measures such as active labour 
market policies. 
Broader approaches to estimating the economic returns on social investment have been 
the focus of various studies. For instance, a Commission study
76 from 2002 estimated the 
return on investment in human capital at the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. 
The study suggests that an additional year of schooling increases wages at the individual 
level by around 6.5 % across European countries. Similarly, a year of training is 
estimated to increase wages by as much as 5 %. At the macro level, the study suggests 
that an extra year at the intermediate level of education — all other things being equal — 
                                                 
75   The size of the population poor and unemployed population at the time of the survey (2010) and of the population  unemployed 
for at least one month over the reference income year (generally 2009) ranged around 1% (or above) of the overall population in 
BG, CZ, DE, EE, IE, EL, ES, LV, LT, HU, PT, SI and SK. It corresponded to more than 10% of the overall poor population in 
CZ, LV and LT. Estimates of the gains are obtained by comparing average labour market incomes, benefit levels (excluding 
pensions) and (direct) taxes across 24 categories (accounting for sex, education in three levels and household composition in 
four levels  — single with or without children, two or more adults with or without children) of poor unemployed and non-poor 
employed people (with overall incomes between the poverty threshold and the median income) and are grouped together in three 
categories : higher household disposable incomes, lower benefits and higher taxes. In one country (LT), non-poor employed 
people show on average slightly higher average benefits levels than poor unemployed people. 
76   Ciccone, A. and de la Fuenta, A. (2002) 'Human capital and a knowledge-based economy' at: http://www.antoniociccone.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2007/07/humancapitalpolicy.pdf   
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increases aggregate productivity by about 5 % immediately and by a further 5 % in the 
long term. 
A December 2011 Eurofound study estimates the economic cost of the group of young 
people that are not in employment, education or training (NEETs, who represented 13% 
of the 15-24 in 2010) in 21 EU countries. The yearly total cost for these countries 
amounts to approximately €100 billion, which corresponds to 1% of their aggregated 
GDP. It can be split into €94 billion in foregone earnings and €7 billion in excess 
transfers. Authors note that the estimation is restricted to the current cost only (in 2008) 
and may be an underestimate of the real cost of NEETs, as additional costs for health, 
criminal justice and unpaid taxes on foregone earnings are not included in the definition 
used. 
Recent evidence gathered by Bell and Blanchflower (2011) highlights the long-term 
scarring effects of youth unemployment in terms of both career and earnings prospects 
for the individuals, and wasted human capital of a generation affected by the crisis. Their 
results show that entering the labour market during a recession often leads to 
substantially lower lifetime earnings for graduates and increased risks of ending up in 
lower-level occupations. They emphasise the delayed negative impacts of unemployment 
when young on well-being, health status and job satisfaction, pointing out that short-run 
government savings may be at the cost of increased future expenditures associated with 
the negative effects of youth unemployment and reduced well-being.  
A UK study
77 estimates that by reducing youth unemployment, up to £10 billion per year 
could be saved.  It takes account of spending on unemployment benefits (-€1.2 bn per 
year), lost productivity (-€6.9 bn per year), the cost of crime (-€1.2 bn) and the cost of 
educational underachievement (-€22bn for those aged 17-24). In the UK, the Joseph 
Rowntree foundation
78 estimated that child poverty costs at least 2% of the GDP, £25 
billion a year, including £17 billion that could accrue to the Exchequer if child poverty 
were eradicated. 
6.  RISKS OVER THE LIFE COURSE AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTERVENTION 
The risk of social and economic disadvantage occurs at different stages in the life course 
but often builds upon earlier experiences and is compounded over time. 
Numerous studies show that children growing up in poverty have lower education 
achievement scores, and that the gap between their scores and those of students from 
higher-income backgrounds widens over time.
79 Levels of educational attainment for 
students from low-income backgrounds are also lower, resulting in a higher risk of 
unemployment and lower future earnings potential later in life. Unemployment and low 
earnings during prime years continue to have an impact on a person's situation in old age, 
as low pension contributions often affect the level of pension available upon retirement. 
                                                 
77    Prince's Trust (2010) The cost of exclusion: counting the cost of youth disadvantage in the UK. http://www.princes-
trust.org.uk/pdf/COE_full_report.pdf 
78   FEANTSA (2008) 
http://www.feantsa.org/files/Month%20Publications/EN/Articles_and_documents_related_to_the_Flash/08_12_flash/UK_Child
Poverty_October.pdf  
79   See, for instance, Sparkes, J. and Glennester, H. (2002) “Preventing Social Exclusion; Education’s Contribution”  
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6.1    Children 
Children are generally more at risk of poverty or social exclusion than the overall 
population, with a rate of 27.1% as against 24.2% for the population as a whole in the EU 
in 2011.
80 Only in a minority of EU countries are children less at risk than the overall 
population. 
Children growing up in poverty and social exclusion are less likely than their better-
off peers to do well at school, to enjoy good health or to realise their full socio-
economic potential later in life. This is reflected in the Recommendation on Investing 
in Children, as part of the Social Investment Package. 
While it is difficult to estimate the exact degree of transmission of inequality and 
disadvantage across generations and how this changes over time,
81 recent evidence 
suggests that intergenerational inequality could be higher than analysts believed a decade 
ago.
82 A recent UK study showed that children of low-income backgrounds have lower 
achievement rates in school, and that differences in family parental resources widen 
during the school years. As a result, there are  wide gaps between of different income 
groups as regards achievement at school. Poor performance at school also reduces future 
earning potential in the long run.
83  
Another study showed that in England, for instance, the highest-performing 15-year-olds 
from poor backgrounds lag, by around two years of schooling Pisa literary test scores, 
behind the highest-performing pupils from privileged backgrounds.
84 Evidence also 
shows that growing up in a disadvantaged environment can have a long-lasting negative 
impact on adult health, and that upward social mobility has very little effect on this.
85 
Yet, as highlighted in the figure below, the degree to which disadvantage is transmitted 
across generations varies significantly across countries.  
                                                 
80   This indicator is the headline indicator for monitoring the Europe 2020 strategy poverty target. It reflects the share of the 
population living in a household which is either at risk of poverty, or severely materially deprived, or with very low work 
intensity.  
81   This is due in particular to the lack of comparable longitudinal data. 
82   OECD (2009) Doing Better for Children, 2009. 
83   UK National Equality Panel (2010) An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK 
84   Studied compared students from the top and bottom HISEI quintiles.  Jerrim, J ' The Socio-Economic Gradient in Teenagers’ 
Reading Skills: How Does England Compare with Other Countries?' Institute of Fiscal Studies, Vol. 33, Is. 2 
85   Poulton, R., Caspi, A., Milne, B.J., et al. (2002), 'Association between children's experience of socioeconomic disadvantage and 
adult health: a life-course study', Lancet, Vol. 360, pp. 1640-1645  
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Figure 6.1 — Link between individual and parental earnings varies across various 
countries
86 
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Source: d'Addio (2007)
87 
The crisis has also worsened children's situations in most of the Member States, mainly 
because of the sharp rise in unemployment that has hit adults of working age. Single-
parent households have been worst hit. They face a much higher risk of poverty and 
social exclusion (above 50 %) compared to other household types. However, even 
families with two adults and two children were exposed to greater risks of poverty or 
social exclusion. 
Figure 6.2 — At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate in the EU (%), children (0-
17), EU-27, 2008 and 2011
88 
  
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC   
Child poverty results from the conjunction of parental wages that are too low and 
inadequate support to households. Social expenditure targeting children can play a 
                                                 
86   The height of each bar measures the extent to which sons’ earnings levels reflect those of their fathers. The estimates are the best 
point estimate of the intergenerational earnings elasticity resulting from an extensive meta-analysis carried out by Corak (2006) 
and supplemented with additional countries from d’Addio (2007). The choice of empirical estimates in this meta-analysis is 
motivated by the fact that they are based on studies that are similar in their estimation technique, sample and variable 
definitions. The higher the value, the greater the persistence of earnings across generations, thus the lower is the 
intergenerational earnings mobility. 
87   Quoted in OECD (2010) Economic Policy Reforms Going for Growth 
88   2010 values instead of 2011 for CY, IE, IT and UK; EU-27 is based on Eurostat estimate for 2011.  
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supporting role to compensate for the cost of raising a child. However, its impact varies 
significantly across the EU, resulting in uneven outcomes in poverty reduction and 
redistributive impact. The role of parental employment and of the tax and benefit systems 
in preventing child poverty and supporting families with children is analysed in the 
September 2012 issue of the Employment and Social Situation Quarterly Review, and in 
the SPC report.
89 
The section below draws largely on these reports. 
Parental employment is the main safeguard against child poverty, but sometimes it is 
not enough. In 2010, 10.7% of the EU working population living in a household with 
dependent children had an income below the national poverty risk threshold, against 8.5 
% of the total working population. In most countries, the family with only one 
breadwinner is a model that no longer protects its members from poverty. The risk of 
poverty for individuals in households with low to medium work intensity (typically 
represented by the one-breadwinner family model) ranges between 15 % and 50 %. 
Families in which both members of a couple have a job are less likely to be at risk of 
poverty. 
The extent to which second earners, often women, take a job is partly determined by the 
expected income gain, after deducting potential additional taxes, the loss of benefits and 
the cost of childcare. An OECD study (OECD, 2011
90) shows that most women entering 
the labour market as second earners have weak financial incentives to do so. Before 
including the cost of childcare, many mothers of young children working full-time are 
unable to increase their family income by even 50 %. Net childcare costs are also a 
critical factor for parents' employment decisions. Compared to a situation in which no 
childcare is bought, the financial reward from employment is substantially reduced by 
childcare costs. At low earnings levels, single parents find that childcare costs reduce the 
returns by as much as 40 %; for second earners, this can be up to 50 %.  
Child and family benefits and, indeed, social protection as a whole have a significant 
impact on reducing child poverty, by over 40% on average in the EU. However, the 
impact varies greatly across Member States. 
Differences in efficiency can be partly explained by differences in the structure of 
benefits (e.g. by function) or their design (e.g. combination of universal versus 
categorical or means-tested, combination of cash or in-kind benefits). Differences in the 
demographic characteristics of households and in the pre-benefits risk of poverty also 
matter.  
                                                 
89   Social Protection Committee (2012) 'Tackling child poverty and social exclusion, promoting child well-being', Social Protection 
Committee, see table p. 27 
90   OECD (2011) Can parents afford to work? An update. The following text largely quotes the results of this study. 
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Figure 6.3 — Poverty reduction effect of family and child benefits for children (0-
17) 
 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2010, UDB, DG EMPL calculations; IE and CY not available. 
As illustrated above, affordable childcare, along with appropriate tax and benefit 
incentives, is very important in enabling parents, and especially mothers, to get a job. For 
children, quality childcare and other services are essential to their well-being and to 
help them develop the social, cognitive and emotional skills that can enable them to 
be successful. Many Member States are lagging behind the so-called Barcelona targets 
for childcare set in 2002.
91 Besides, evidence
92 shows that children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, who would benefit most from quality early childhood education and care, 
are far less likely to benefit from such services. Households on low incomes face barriers 
in getting access to childcare. These can include eligibility criteria, for instance, if 
employed parents get priority; lack of services, especially in disadvantaged or rural areas; 
or services may simply be too expensive. Only one out of two Roma children attend pre-
school or kindergarten in BG, EL, HU, IT, PT, SK, CZ, FR, PL, RO, ES on average.
93 
Health status plays a determining role in defining children’s future life chances. There 
are still many obstacles to good healthcare for children. National and international studies 
point to the existence and persistence of social inequalities in children’s health outcomes 
and access to prevention in various fields across the EU. The 2009 EU-SILC module on 
material deprivation found that the rate of children with an unmet need to consult a 
general practitioner or dentist is much higher among those at risk of poverty or materially 
deprived. It also found that 11 % of the children at risk of poverty did not eat fresh fruit 
or vegetables once a day because the household could not afford it, against 3 % for the 
rest of the population.
94 
Differences in educational performance and in early-school-leaving rates can also be 
observed by gender. In education, the share of low-achieving boys is close to twice the 
share of low-achieving girls. In almost all EU Member States a lower proportion of boys 
reaches upper secondary graduation compared to girls and on average early school 
                                                 
91   The Barcelona targets will be used as an indicator in the European Semester 
92   Ghysels, J. and Van Lancker, W. (2011) 'The unequal benefits of activation: an analysis of the social distribution of family 
policy among families with young children' Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 21 No. 5 pp. 472-485 
93   European Commission Staff Working Document — Progress towards the common European objectives in education and 
training-Indicators and benchmarks-2010/2011, SEC(2011)526 
94   Social Protection Committee (2012) 'Tackling child poverty and social exclusion, promoting child well-being', see table p. 27  
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leaving is more than 30 % higher amongst boys than amongst girls.
95 Research on gender 
and education points to the significance of gender stereotyping in shaping educational 
outcomes.
96 
Most indicators of housing quality underline that children (and consequently families) 
are at a greater disadvantage than the rest of the population. Almost a quarter of children 
(and 40 % of children at risk of poverty) live in overcrowded
97 accommodation, 
compared to 18 % of the EU population as a whole. Households with children face a 
slightly higher risk of being overburdened by housing costs, especially in the southern 
countries. Children at risk of poverty are more likely to be living in unhealthy and unsafe 
housing conditions.
98 
Almost 1 million children are estimated to be living in alternative care
99 in the EU.
100 
The high number of children from a disadvantaged background in alternative care
101 and 
the reasons they are there are often associated with poverty and social exclusion. This
102 
suggests that more support to families at risk would enable more parents in difficult 
situations to care for their children themselves. If removal from the family is considered 
as being in the child’s best interest, then it is essential that children are placed in a 
supportive, secure environment that helps them develop to their full potential.
103 The 
negative consequences of large residential institutions on children’s health and 
psychosocial development are well known.
104 
6.2    Youth 
The unemployment rates for young people are generally 2.5 times higher than that for 
the population of working age as a whole. They have been hit particularly hard by the 
economic crisis. The lack of jobs has been felt particularly severely by young people 
aged 15 to 24. This has just exacerbated their already weak position relative to other age 
groups. The unemployment rate for young people reached 23.7 % in November 2012.  
                                                 
95   European Commission Staff Working Document —Education and Training Monitor 2012,  (SWD(2012) 373 final, 20.11.2012 
96   Eurydice (2009) Gender differences and Educational Outcomes:  Study on the Measures Taken and the Current Situation in 
Europe 
97   The dwelling is considered overcrowded if one the criteria mentioned below is not fulfilled: - 1 room for the household; plus one 
extra room for— each couple; —each single person aged 18+; — for two single people of the same sex between 12 and 17 years 
of age; — for each single person of different sex between 12 and 17 years of age; —for two people under 12 years of age. 
98   'Tackling child poverty and social exclusion, promoting child well-being', Social Protection Committee, 2012, see table p. 27 
99   'Alternative care' refers to care provided to children deprived of parental care, including: 
(i)   informal care: any private arrangement provided in a family environment, whereby the child is looked after on an ongoing 
or indefinite basis by relatives or by others in their individual capacity, at the initiative of the child, his/her parents or other 
person without this arrangement having been ordered by an administrative or judicial authority or a duly accredited body; 
(ii)   formal care: all care provided in a family environment which has been ordered by a competent administrative body or 
judicial authority, and all care provided in a residential environment, including in private facilities, whether or not as a 
result of administrative or judicial measures 
100   Eurochild (2010) National surveys on children in alternative care 
101   Recent studies have also confirmed the overrepresentation of children of Roma origin in institutions across several EU countries, 
'Romani Children in Institutional Care', European Roma Rights Center and Bulgaria Helsinki Committee, 2011. 
102   In particular inadequate housing, single parenthood, lack of access to welfare, unemployment, lack of access to day-care and 
specialised services for children with disabilities, children's health condition, stigma and discrimination 
103   'Guidelines for alternative care of children', UN framework, 2009 
104   K. Browne (2009) 'The Risk of Harm to Young Children in Institutional Care', pp. 9 – 17;  Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (2011) 'Forgotten Europeans, Forgotten Rights – The Human Rights of Persons Placed in 
Institutions'  
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Figure 6.4 — Youth unemployment and year-on-year changes, July 2012 
 
Source: European Commission 
The fall in employment for young people was most pronounced in permanent and full-
time jobs. The relative resilience or expansion of temporary and part-time jobs was not 
enough to make up for the falls recorded in permanent and full-time employment. More 
than 40 % of young employees in the EU have temporary jobs, and that proportion has 
grown during the downturn. In the first quarter of 2012, the percentage stood at 40.6 %, 
against 13.1 % for the population of working age as a whole. 
 
The deterioration in the employment situation for the young has also led to a sharp rise in 
the number of young people who are not in employment, education or training (NEET). 
This can be seen as a specific measure of youth social exclusion, reflecting their lack of 
contact with the labour market and education and has implications not just in the present, 
but also for their future inclusion in society. Risk of NEET status is disproportionately 
linked to low educational attainment and early school leaving. Many of those concerned 
also lack soft skills, vocational training, and work experience to navigate the transition 
into the labour market when leaving school.
105 This often indicates earlier social 
exclusion, during childhood years. 
In the first quarter of 2012, 13.2 % of young people (7.5 million) fell into the NEET 
category, up sharply (by around 1 million) on the 10.7 % registered four years earlier. 
                                                 
105   Bynner, J. and Parsons, S. (2002) 'Social Exclusion and the Transition from School to Work: The Case of Young People Not in 
Education, Employment or Training', Journal of Vocational Behavior, 60, pp. 289-309. 
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This raises concerns about the potential consequences and implications of NEET status. 
The risk of NEET disaffection has been investigated by a Eurofound study
106 exploring 
the consequences of the social and political marginalisation of youth; it estimated that the 
cost of NEETs adds up to 1 % of GDP in the 21 EU Member States studied. The analysis 
also revealed that NEETs have low trust in institutions and a low level of political and 
social participation. Empirical evidence confirms that NEETs are at a higher risk of 
disaffection and more likely to withdraw from society. In response to this the European 
Commission presented a Communication on a Youth Employment Package with concrete 
proposals and measures aimed at combating youth unemployment, including a proposal 
for a Council Recommendation on Youth Guarantees.
107 
Figure 6.5 — NEET rates across EU Member States (2008-2011) 
 
While NEET status is more linked to low educational attainment and early school 
leaving, the labour market situation of young people who have recently graduated from 
education and training has also deteriorated. In fact, the employment rate of individuals 
aged 20-34 that recently graduated from at least upper-secondary education has fallen by 
almost 5 percentage points since 2008, to 77.2 % in 2011.
108 This figure highlights the 
particular difficulty that young people have transitioning from school to employment. 
6.3    Working-age populations 
Employment rates increased in all EU countries before the crisis. In the same period, the 
numbers of working poor remained unchanged and the number of people living  in 
jobless households was only reduced marginally, while overall poverty rates were not 
significantly reduced. The jobs created often did not reach the most excluded, or did not 
provide decent living standards. These trends were mainly due to a growing gap between 
job-rich and job-poor individuals and households, and to disparities in earnings and 
working conditions among workers.  
Education and skills level is a major factor in employment. In 2011, the long-term 
unemployment rate was more than four times higher for those with lower education 
                                                 
106   Eurofound (2012) 'Young people and NEETS in Europe: First findings', European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions 
107   See:  http://europa.eu/newsroom/calendar/event/408085/commission-presents-a-communication-on-a-youth-employment-
package 
108  The European Council approved in May 2012 a benchmark highlighting the importance of the youth transition phase from 
education to employment. In particular, the benchmark states that “By 2020, the share of employed graduates, 20 to 34 years old 
having left education and training (at levels ISCED 3-6) no more than three years before the reference year, should be at least 
82%”.  
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levels (7.9 %) than it was for the highly educated (1.9 %) and more than twice as high as 
it was for those with a medium education level (3.7 %).
109  
Figure 6.6 —  Long-term unemployment rate by educational level, as a percentage 
of the active population, 2011
110 
 
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU-LFS 
Having a job however does not always avert the risk of poverty, however. The working 
poor account for a third of adults of working age at risk of poverty. In 2010, 8 % of those 
in employment were living under the poverty threshold. 
In-work poverty significantly increased in a third of EU countries between 2006 and 
2010. They included Germany (+2pps), and the Netherlands and Denmark, where labour 
market reforms (e.g. wage moderation) and reforms of the tax and benefits system 
contributed to bringing more people into jobs, but did not always provide them with a 
living wage. Since 2000, there has been a growing trend towards temporary work, part-
time work (including situations where that is all the employer offers, rather than being 
the choice of the employee) and sometimes stagnating wages. Taken together, these 
factors have increased the number of people on low yearly earnings. These trends 
particularly affected women and the young. It is also important to note that in many 
countries, such jobs are not stepping stones towards better ones  —  they are so-called 
‘dead-end jobs’(see ESDE 2011 — chapter 4). 
In-work poverty is linked to aspects of poor-quality jobs, such as low pay, low skills, 
precarious employment and under-employment. In-work poverty is also related to low 
work intensity in the household, i.e. situations where there are too few adults working in 
the household, or not working enough to earn a living (working too few hours or for only 
part of the year). Among these, single-parent households where the parent is not working 
full-time, and single-earner families face the highest risks of poverty.
111 
                                                 
109   The classification of educational levels is based on ISCED: low level of education means ‘at most lower secondary’ (ISCED 0-
2), a medium level of education means ‘upper secondary and post secondary (non tertiary)’ (ISCED 3-4), and a high level of 
education means ‘tertiary education’ (ISCED 5-6).  
110   MT: data not publishable due to the sample size being too small. 
111  An in-depth analysis of the drivers of in-work poverty and the policy instruments that can best be mobilised to tackle it is 
available in the European Commission Staff Working Document  'Follow-up on the implementation by the Member States of the  
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Figure 6.7 —  In-work poverty: at-risk-of-poverty rate of persons employed, change 
since 2008
112 
 
Source: Eurostat – EU-SILC.  
 
The last decade has also seen the persistence of groups that remain outside or on the 
fringes of the labour market, often facing multiple barriers to getting a job. Low skills, 
care responsibilities, age, a migrant background, and other factors of discrimination are 
among these. Those worst-off are in households in which nobody works. In 2010 in the 
EU-27, 9.9 % of children and adults of working age were living in jobless households 
(i.e., in households with zero or very low work intensity), against 9 % in 2008. The crisis 
has already started to increase the number of families having to rely entirely on social 
benefits. 
                                                                                                                                                 
2008 European Commission recommendation on active inclusion of people excluded from the labour market – Towards a social 
investment approach'  SWD(2013) 39 
112   The income reference period is a fixed 12-month period (such as the previous calendar or tax year) for all countries except the 
United Kingdom for which the income reference period is the current year of the survey and Ireland for which the survey is 
continuous and income is collected for the 12 months prior to the survey. 2010 values instead of 2011 for IE ; EU27 is based on 
Eurostat estimate for 2011.  
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Figure 6.8  — Developments in the share of people living in jobless/very low work 
intensity households across EU Member States, 2008-2011 
 
 
Experience from past crises shows that the numbers of those affected by long-term 
unemployment or inactivity tend to persist long after recovery has set in.
113 The main 
reason for this is the loss of human capital and skills caused by long periods spent out of 
work. In 2011, nearly 10 million unemployed Europeans (accounting for 4.2 % of the 
active population) had been out of a job for more than 12 months. This is an increase of 
3.7 million or 60.8 % in comparison to 2008. Trends in long-term unemployment are 
becoming increasingly diverse among Member States. Between 2008 and 2011, the long-
term unemployment rate rose in almost all Member States, with a particularly strong rise 
(more than 5 pps) in Greece, Spain, Ireland and the Baltic countries. 
Since 2008, the probability of someone unemployed finding a job has decreased in most 
countries, for both the short- and the long-term unemployed. This trend has been 
particularly marked in Spain (from 50 % to around 30 %) and Greece (from 25 % to 
15 %). On the other hand, the rate has remained stable in the Netherlands and has 
improved in the Czech Republic and Estonia. The risk of those who have a job falling 
back into unemployment has also risen. In Spain, Greece and Cyprus (but also in Sweden 
and Finland) there is a high risk of short spells of unemployment recurring, because of 
the large number of temporary contracts. 
                                                 
113   Social Protection Committee (2009) Growth Jobs and Progress in the EU: A contribution to the evaluation of the social 
dimension of the Lisbon Strategy. See: http://www.ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=3898&langId=en    
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Figure 6.9 — Transition rate from unemployment: situation one year after 
unemployment, by duration in unemployment, in 2010-11, aged 25-49, EU-13 
Long-term 
unemployed 
Short-term 
unemployed 
 
Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS, DG EMPL ad-hoc calculations. 
The lingering effects of the crisis and the rise in long-term unemployment have sharply 
increased the risks of long-term exclusion. Evidence
114 shows that, before the crisis 
(2005-2009), the risks of entering and exiting poverty varied greatly across Member 
States. There are three main groups of countries: 
                                                 
114   European Commission (2012) Employment and social developments in Europe 2012  
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Group 1: Austria, France and the UK. Rates of entry into and exit from poverty are 
high, although in some of these countries, a significant share of those at risk of poverty 
form a ‘core group’ that does not take part in the churning.  
Group 2: Baltic States, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain. There is a high risk of 
entering into poverty, and low chances of getting out of it, creating a massive poverty 
trap. The evidence relates to pre-crisis data; the trap has certainly got worse since. 
Group 3: Nordic and Benelux countries. Rates of entry into and exit from poverty are 
low. However, the proportion of people at risk of persistent poverty is high, which may 
be a sign of social polarisation, with a group of people trapped in poverty. 
Figure 6.10 —Share of persistent poor crossed with entry and exit patterns 
 
Source: EUSILC LONGITUDINAL  UDB 2009 version 3of August  2012;  DG EMPL 
calculations 
6.4    Older people 
In half the Member States, the oldest generations (aged over 65) face a lower risk of 
poverty than the population as a whole. But the risk of poverty is relatively high for the 
elderly in Cyprus, Bulgaria, Greece, the United Kingdom, Slovenia, Spain, Belgium and 
Portugal. However, the at-risk-of-poverty rate does not take into account housing  
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costs,
115 and might, in some cases, overestimate the extent of poverty among the elderly 
as they often own their own housing, so do not have mortgage repayments or rent to pay. 
The oldest tend to live on lower incomes and those aged 75 and over tend to be at greater 
risk of poverty. This reflects the lower levels of payments from pension systems 
developed in the 1950s and 1960s. It can also be attributed to lower accrued pension 
entitlements and a lower number of years worked, especially among women. 
The gap between men and women facing poverty varies with age. It is clearly worse for 
people over 65 than it is for younger generations. Differences in life expectancy mean a 
rise in the number of widows and therefore single women. Because they have worked a 
lower number of years than men, older women often receive lower pensions, though in 
many Member States, survivor’s pensions do give widows some protection from poverty. 
Figure 6.11 — The risk of poverty for elderly people by gender,
116 EU-27, 2011 
 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC, 2011 
Men’s pension incomes are usually higher than women’s. The gender pension gap is due 
to differences in employment rates and employment conditions during working life, e.g. 
the gender pay gap, and an unequal distribution of roles when it comes to looking after 
others, but can also be due to the design of pension schemes and trends in pension 
reforms. 
More numerous among older cohorts, women are also more exposed to the risk of 
poverty, but they may receive better replacement rates (i.e., pension as a percentage of 
pre-retirement labour income) and better returns on their pension contributions since they 
are the main beneficiaries of minimum, guaranteed and survivor's pensions.  
                                                 
115   Whether or not to include housing costs in the definition of income underpinning the risk of poverty rate has sparked much 
debate in past years and will probably continue to do so in the future. The conclusion of the SPC indicator subgroup was that 
such costs should not be included. Indeed, imputing rents is a difficult exercise, especially at the European level. Real estate 
prices are so heterogeneous across geographical zones that they could induce more bias than correcting it. 
116   About a fifth of people aged 65 or older have pension incomes just below or just above the poverty risk threshold, consequently 
relatively small increases or decreases in their pensions can lead to important variations in the poverty rates of the elderly.  
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Figure 6.12 — Gender differences towards the risk of poverty in older age groups, 
2011
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Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC, 2011 
 
                                                 
117   Data for IE, IT, CY, UK refer to 2010 